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Designing Model Homes for the Changing Medical
Neighborhood: A Multi-Payer Pilot Offers Lessons for
ACO and PCMH Construction
Sallie Thieme Sanford
I.

MODEL HOMES FOR REZONED MEDICAL NEIGHBORHOODS

Washington State is in the midst of a multi-payer model home
test with implications for the nascent national effort to construct new
health care payment and delivery systems. The model homes are
redesigned primary care medical practices. Their structural supports
include additional upfront payments, potential shared savings, and
other elements reflective of “accountable care.” Accountable care, in
its basic blueprint, requires an affiliated group of health care
providers to accept responsibility for the overall costs and quality of
care for a defined population.
1
Accountable care requires a solid primary care foundation. And
that foundation might well be a Patient-Centered Medical Home
(PCMH). Indeed, in some formulations, a PCMH is a necessary part
2
of any well-functioning Accountable Care Organization (ACO). The

Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law, Adjunct Assistant
Professor, University of Washington Department of Health Services,
sanfords@u.washington.edu. For their helpful comments, I am grateful to the
participants at the Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium (Implementing the
Affordable Care Act: What Role for Accountable Care Organizations?), Richard K.
Onizuka, PhD, Aaron B. Katz and Christopher Sanford, M.D., M.P.H. Rebecca Leah
Levine, M.P.H., J.D., provided excellent research assistance. My interest in this topic
is academic, and it also has a personal component. My husband is a family practice
physician. His clinic recently moved to a new site, with a different physical set-up,
and practice changes reflective of the medical home model. While a different clinic
in the University of Washington Neighborhood Clinics system is involved in the pilot
described here, my husband’s is not.
1
See generally Elliott S. Fisher & Stephen M. Shortell, Accountable Care
Organizations: Accountable for What, to Whom, and How, 304 JAMA 1715 (2010); Elliott
S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 219 (2009).
2
Diane R. Rittenhouse et al., Primary Care and Accountable Care—Two Essential
Elements of Delivery-System Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2303 (2009); see also
Bruce E. Landon et al., Prospects for Rebuilding Primary Care Using the Patient-Centered
Medical Home, 29 HEALTH AFF. 827, 831 (2010) and Stephen M. Shortell, Key to Health
Care Reform: Changing How Care is Delivered, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
399, 407 (2011).

1519

SANFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1520

10/22/2012 2:45 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1519

3

PCMH is “not far removed in principle” from the ACOs that are the
focus of the other articles in this Symposium. “The PCMH is
reflective of coordination of care; the ACO is reflective of the
4
continuum of care.” The two have the potential to be mutually
supportive.
To deliver on its promise of care coordination, the PCMH
5
“needs a hospitable and high-performing medical neighborhood.”
Promoting these neighborhoods is a key focus of the Affordable Care
6
Act (ACA) of 2010, with its multitude of programs and pilots, and of
related private-sector initiatives. The new Medicare ACO program
functions as a rezoning effort. Its rules allow and encourage
development of new health care structures. This rezoning effort
supports transformation of the nation’s medical neighborhoods, with
the goals of improving their occupants’ health while simultaneously
reining in overall medical costs.
Washington’s “Multi-Payer Medical Home Reimbursement
7
Pilot” shares these goals. It involves most of the state’s major
insurers in a thirty-two-month project to provide upfront payments
for enhanced primary care in selected practices. These practices will
also see shared savings if there are reductions in emergency room
(ER) visits or hospitalizations beyond set targets. These practices face
8
downside financial risk for failure to meet quality and usage targets.
This pilot project shares many features of prominent accountable
care initiatives, but there are also key differences.
The pilot’s design and early construction thus offer ideas for
others attempting similar remodels. And ideas are especially useful
as to this type of health care reform because we do not yet have many

3

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 185 (West, 6th ed. Supp. 2011).
Gary Scott Davis & Julie Brillman, Innovative Approaches to Care: Accountable Care
Organizations and Medical Homes, AM. HEALTH LAW. ASS’N, at 8 (June 29, 2010),
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/AM10
/davis_accountable_care.pdf.
5
Elliott S. Fisher, Building a Medical Neighborhood for the Medical Home, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (2008).
6
See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.111-148
(March 23, 2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152 (March 30, 2010).
7
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., WASHINGTON STATE MULTI-PAYER MEDICAL
HOME REIMBURSEMENT PILOT: INVITATION TO APPLY 2 (2010), available at
http://www.hca.wa.gov/documents/medical_homes/invitation_%20multi-payer
_medical_home_reimbursement.doc.
8
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7.
4
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generalizable results and “unrealistic expectations . . . abound.”
Even as we await results, construction proceeds on new healthcare
delivery and payment systems. As with any fast-track construction
project, mid-development blueprint revisions are to be expected.
This Article first describes the ingrained construction incentives
in our current health care system and the challenges they present.
The Article then turns to key innovations to address these challenges,
with a particular focus on accountable care and medical homes.
10
Next, the Article considers the early spec houses that provide the
model for the PCMHs under development throughout the country.
Then, the Article focuses on the design and finance features of
Washington’s ongoing pilot. Finally, the Article concludes with
thoughts on a series of questions raised by this pilot and others like it.
Ultimately, what medical home designs are best suited for our
rezoned medical neighborhoods?
II. PROBLEMATIC INGRAINED CONSTRUCTION INCENTIVES
In their writings, both Atul Gawande and Donald Berwick
describe a particular health care project that illustrates a central
problem that these new structures—PCMHs and ACOs—both
11
attempt to address.
The problem is misaligned incentives; the
project Gawande and Berwick describe involves pediatric asthma.
In response to repeated hospitalizations of children with severe
asthma, health care providers in Boston adopted a coordinated,
flexible, patient-centered approach, which went beyond the “tyranny
12
of the 15-minute visit.”
Following a child’s discharge from the
hospital, nurses conducted home visits to help reduce allergen

9

Fisher, supra note 5, at 1202.
A “spec house” is one “built on speculation that a buyer will be found.” AM.
HERITAGE ABBREVIATIONS DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005), s.v. “spec house,” available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spec%20house.
11
See Atul Gawande, Now What?, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 5, 2010, at 21; see also
Donald M. Berwick, Making Good on ACOs’ Promise—The Final Rule for the Medicare
11
Shared Savings Program 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (2011). Dr. Berwick was the head
of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services during the initial implementation
of the Affordable Care Act until his resignation in December 2011, shortly before his
recess appointment expired. Doug Trapp, CMS Chief Dr. Berwick to Step Down Dec. 2,
MED.
NEWS
(Nov.
23,
2011),
http://www.amaAM .
assn.org/amednews/2011/11/21/gvsg1123.htm.
12
Berwick, supra note 11, at 1755. Dr. Berwick was the head of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services during the initial implementation of the Affordable
Care Act until his resignation in December 2011 shortly before his recess
appointment expired.
10
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triggers and teach proper inhaler use. Allergists and pharmacists
14
consulted with pediatricians on care plans. Nurse practitioners were
available for after-hours telephone consultations.
The project saw good results. Hospital readmission rates for
15
these children plunged more than 80 percent. The children were
16
healthier.
Their parents had to miss less work. Overall costs
17
decreased. So what was the problem? The financial model. Most of
the costs of this approach—outside of the traditional office visits and
prescriptions—were not reimbursed. And Children’s Hospital lost
18
revenue from one of its leading sources of admissions.
Raising a free-rider issue, the savings basically redounded to the
insurers. (Among the insurers in this situation, the state’s Medicaid
system probably featured prominently; it, no doubt, could use a
financial boost.) In a fragmented system, the hospital business model
19
is not unlike that of a hotel; it is about “butts in beds.”
While
providers’ interests, ethics, and reputations are tied to their patients’
health outcomes, their payment typically is linked to procedures and
office visits. They are rewarded for volume, not necessarily value.
The United States’ health care system has “payment and
organizational features that reward high volume rather than low cost
20
or high quality.”
Outside of fully integrated systems, savings do not necessarily
flow to those that expend the extra costs that lead to the savings. The
current fee-for-service (FFS) system typically does not pay for services
such as phone calls for care coordination, extended hours, team
meetings, condition tracking, and email communication. And there
is usually no direct financial disincentive for unnecessarily high
13

Gawande, supra note 11, at 22.
Berwick, supra note 11, at 1753.
15
Elizabeth R. Woods et al., Community Asthma Initiative: Evaluation of a Quality
Improvement Program for Comprehensive Asthma Care, 129 PEDIATRICS 465, 468 (2012).
16
Berwick, supra note 11, at 1753.
17
See generally Gawande, supra note 11, at 22; Berwick, supra note 11, at 1753.
18
Gawande, supra note 11, at 22.
19
This paraphrases a presentation given by Dr. Jeffrey Brenner, M.D. Jeffrey
Brenner, Founder, Camden Coal. of Healthcare Providers, Keynote Address at the
Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act: What
Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011) (notes on file with
author); see also Dartmouth, Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers, Bending the
Cost Curve and Improving Quality in One of America’s Poorest Cities, YOUTUBE
(May 30, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paiA0Tpw_64.
20
Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. e1(1), e1(1) (2011).
14
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utilization elsewhere, in the form of avoidable lab work, ER visits, or
hospitalizations. Indeed, one of the ways in which the United States’
health care system is an outlier is in its high level of duplicative
21
testing.
This is not a new problem, but it is one in search of new
solutions. In the 1980s, many hoped that managed care would both
hold down costs and also improve quality, particularly where health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) received a set amount per
member per month to cover all of a subscriber’s health care needs.
In this vision, integration and capitation would work to appropriately
align incentives. The 1990s saw the managed care backlash, with
concerns that quality and access were being sacrificed in the name of
22
cost control. Managed care has had successes, and some HMOs
have remained popular with high marks for quality and cost23
effectiveness.
Overall, though, the FFS fragmented system
24
predominates.
III. NEW OR NEWLY PROMINENT DESIGN INNOVATIONS
There is a multitude of new ideas, or at least newly prominent
ideas.
They are promoted by private insurance companies,
employers, health systems, and governments. They have received a
boost from the ACA, which includes a variety of rules, pilots, and
demonstrations aimed at transforming the system from one that pays
25
for piecework to one that rewards better outcomes. Though the
recent health reform effort has been criticized for not focusing more
on our nation’s extremely high health care costs, it does contain
provisions that address the “triple aim”: improving the quality of care
for patients, advancing the overall health of the population, and
26
slowing the growth of health care costs.
Within Medicare, for example, the ACA promotes bundled
21

THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, WHY NOT THE BEST? RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL
SCORECARD ON U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, 2011 46 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report
/2011/Oct/1500_WNTB_Natl_Scorecard_2011_web.pdf.
22
See generally Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash,
17 HEALTH AFF. 80 (1998).
23
See Macaran A. Baird, The Patient-Center Medical Home and Managed Care: Times
Have Changed, Some Components Have Not, 24 J. AM. BD. FAMILY MED. 630, 630 (2011).
24
Atul Gawande, Piecework, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 4, 2005, at 44.
25
Id.
26
Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 760
(2008); see also Shortell, supra note 2, at 399 (describing programs—notably the ACO
and PCMH programs—that address the triple aims).
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payments (a set amount to, say, fix a knee, rather than separate
payments for office visits, surgery, hospital stay, physical therapy, and
27
a walker) as well as limitations on paying for hospital readmissions
28
(to encourage better discharge coordination).
As to the entire
system, for example, the ACA promotes effectiveness research
(through a variety of studies and institutes) and expanded use of
electronic record-keeping systems (in the form of financial incentives
29
as well as penalties). These tend to “reward outcomes of care and
30
not volume of procedures or services delivered.”
Stephen Shortell argues that to respond appropriately to these
financial incentives, physicians and hospitals need new organizational
31
structures, such as ACOs and PCMHs. One of the ACA systemic
reform provisions receiving the most attention is the Medicare
Shared Savings Program, which is designed to encourage the
establishment of ACOs. The concept of accountable care has been
32
promoted in the work of Elliott Fisher, Stephen Shortell, and others
33
In the ACA’s
and has been tested in the Medicare program.
formulation, an organization of health care providers that agrees to
be accountable for the total care of a defined group of Medicare
beneficiaries and meets specified quality metrics may share in any
34
savings that accrue to the Medicare system. Organizations accepted
35
into the Medicare ACO program agree to participate for three years.
This program functions as a rezoning effort. It allows and
encourages the development of new health care structures. While
there are financial incentives to engage in this development, the
ultimate goal, as in the best rezones, is not to increase the developers’
coffers, but rather to improve the neighborhood. The hope is that
appropriately designed new structures will improve health outcomes
while simultaneously reining in overall medical costs. As with any
rezone, assessment of its results awaits usage.

27

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
3023, 124 Stat. 119, 399 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396cc-4).
28
§ 3025 (a) 124 Stat. at 408; Hospital Readmissions Reduction Programs
(HRRP), 76 Fed. Reg. 51660 (Aug. 18, 2011).
29
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1561, 124 Stat. at 262 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300jj-51).
30
Shortell, supra note 2, at 400.
31
Id. at 402–03.
32
Fisher & Shortell, supra note 1, at 1715; see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 219.
33
Fisher & Shortell, supra note 1, at 1715.
34
§ 3022, 124 Stat. at 395 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj).
35
Id.
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Lessons from the managed care backlash feature in this
program’s design.
The Medicare ACO program imposes no
restrictions on the ability of beneficiaries to seek care outside the
36
37
ACO. And the ACOs must meet quality standards. Developing
and tracking these standards is presumably much more feasible now
than in prior decades given the expansion of electronic health
records (EHRs) and evidence-based practice guidelines. In addition,
while accountable care requires coordinated working relationships,
the Medicare ACO program does not necessarily require corporate
integration.
The federal model is intended to work synergistically with
private accountable care initiatives, and requires a significant primary
care presence. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
38
(CMS) published proposed rules in April 2011, issued extensively
39
revised final rules in October 2011, accepted initial applications in
January 2012, and announced the first group of 27 ACOs in April
40
41
2012. CMS announced the second group of 89 ACOs in July 2012.
This is a new and complicated program. A fast-track “Pioneer
Program” kicked off in 2011 for 32 entities that are already highly
integrated and willing to accept more financial risk in the form of
42
partial capitation.
Particularly because of the involvement of commercial payers,
ACOs bump up against legal issues related to tax-exempt status,

36

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., New Affordable Care Act
Program to Improve Care, Control Medicare Costs, Off to a Strong Start (Apr. 10,
2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=
4333.
37
Id.
38
Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19528 (proposed April 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425).
39
Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
425).
40
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 36.
41
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS announces 89 New
Accountable
Care
Organizations
(July
9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120709a.html. Among these 89 is
the Polyclinic Management Services Company, one of whose clinics is a participant in
the PCMH pilot described in this article.
42
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Affordable Care Act
helps 32 health systems improve care for patients, saving up to $1.1 billion (Dec. 19,
2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/12/20111219a.html.
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antitrust rules, and fraud and abuse prohibitions.
Thus, with
publication of the 696-page Medicare ACO final rule, the relevant
federal agencies released guidance documents setting out ACO
44
exemptions and special procedures.
45
The ACA also separately promotes a variety of PCMH projects.
The two models can be viewed as interlocking components in support
of systemic reform. “The PCMH is reflective of coordination of care;
46
the ACO is reflective of the continuum of care.” So just what is a
PCMH?
IV. EARLY SPEC HOUSES
The concept of a “medical home” is not new. In fact, in its basic
47
outlines, it dates back nearly half a century. The American Academy
of Pediatricians introduced the idea in 1967 with the aim of
48
improving the care of children with special needs. It recognized
that the health care needs of these children were often quite complex
and could benefit from active coordination among the disparate
49
treatment sites. The medical home is now “trumpeted not only as a
method of improving care for children with medical needs but for
50
anyone who participates in the health care system.”
43

Timothy S. Jost, Health Reform Requires Law Reform, 28 HEALTH AFF. w761, w767
(2009) (describing legal challenges of partial integration and possibility of federal
revisions and waivers).
44
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2011-16 I.R.B. 652, NOTICE 2011-20 (2011); Statement
of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28,
2011); Memorandum from the Medicare Shared Savings Program to Medicare
Shared Savings Program Applicants (Mar. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/Memo_Additional_Guidance_on_ACO
_Participants.pdf.
45
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
3502, 124 Stat. 119, 513 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 256a-1) (establishing
community health teams to support the patient-centered medical home); Pub. L. No.
111-148 § 3021, 124 Stat. 389 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a) (testing new
payment models), Pub L. No. 111-148 § 5301, 124 Stat. 615 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 293k) (primary care training and enhancement).
46
Davis & Brillman, supra note 4, at 1.
47
See John K. Iglehart, No Place Like Home: Testing a New Model of Care Delivery, 359
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1200, 1200 (2008).
48
See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, COUNCIL ON PEDIATRIC PRACTICE, Pediatric Records
and a “Medical Home”, in STANDARDS OF CHILD CARE 77–79 (1967).
49
Id.
50
Dominic J. Cirincione, The Medical Home Model: Is There Really No Place Like
Home?, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 139, 144 (2010) (citing Prologue: The Medical
Home, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1218, 1218 (2008)).
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Although the phrases “medical home” and “patient-centered
medical care” are increasingly bandied about, firm definitions remain
elusive. There is a lot of jargon. In some respects, these phrases have
become policy shorthand for the reinvention and reinvigoration of
51
primary care in the United States.
In 2007, four physician organizations developed Joint Principles
52
for the PCMH model.
The principles capture many of the oftrepeated elements (and also reflect the fact that they were written by
physician groups). These are the seven principles:
Personal physician—each patient has an ongoing relationship
with a personal physician trained to provide first contact,
continuous and comprehensive care.
Physician directed medical practice—the personal physician
leads a team of individuals at the practice level who
collectively take responsibility for the ongoing care of
patients.
Whole person orientation—the personal physician is
responsible for providing for all the patient’s health care
needs or taking responsibility for appropriately arranging
care with other qualified professionals. This includes care
for all stages of life: acute care, chronic care, preventive
services, and end of life care.
Care is coordinated and/or integrated across all elements of the
complex health care system . . . and the patient’s
community . . . .
Care is facilitated by registries,
information technology, health information exchange and
other means to assure that patients get the indicated care
when and where they need and want it in a culturally and
linguistically appropriate manner.
Quality and safety are hallmarks of the medical home:
[practices advocate for their patients, use evidenced-based
medicine; adopt performance measurement techniques,
engage patients in decision-making, appropriately utilize
information technology, seek recognition as a medical
home by a non-governmental entity, involve patients and
families in quality improvement activities.]
Enhanced access to care is available through systems such as
open scheduling, expanded hours and new options for
communication between patients, their personal physician,
51

See Landon, supra note 2 at 827.
AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, AM. COLL. OF
PHYSICIANS & AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N, JOINT PRINCIPLES OF THE PATIENT-CENTERED
MEDICAL HOME (2007), available at http://www.pcpcc.net/content/joint-principlespatient-centered-medical-home.
52
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and practice staff.
Payment appropriately recognizes the added value provided
to patients who have a patient-centered medical home. The
payment structure should . . . : [reflect the value of care
management; pay for care coordination; support the use of
information technology; support email and telephone
consultation; recognize the value of remote monitoring;
allow separate FFS payments for face-to-face visits; recognize
case mix differences; allow physicians to share in savings
from reduced hospitalizations; allow for additional
53
payments for quality improvements.]
These Joint Principles contemplate recognition of a medical
54
home by “an appropriate non-governmental entity.” The National
Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) now offers a PCMH
55
“recognized practice” designation. The NCQA accredits, certifies
and recognizes a range of health care organizations, and its
56
imprimatur holds weight among insurers and others. Its criteria for
PCMH recognition square with the Joint Principles, and set out
specifics for different levels of attainment towards full recognition.
57
PCMH pilots abound in both the public and private sectors.
Some of the earliest pilots developed in integrated systems, such as
Geisinger Health System in Pennsylvania and Group Health
58
Cooperative (“Group Health”) in Washington State. Group Health
is a non-profit, integrated health insurance and delivery system that
employs most of its physicians. In 2006, it piloted a medical home
59
demonstration at one of its clinics near Seattle.
The redesign
included increased patient engagement through the EHR and care
53

Id.
Id.
55
Patient-Centered Medical Home, NAT’L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE,
http://www.ncqa.org/tabid/631/default.aspx (last visited April 10, 2012).
56
As of November 2011, the NCQA also accredits ACOs. Accountable Care
COMM.
FOR
QUALITY
ASSURANCE,
Organizations
(ACO),
NAT’L
http://www.ncqa.org/tabid/1312/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
57
See, e.g., AM. HOSP. ASS’N, PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICAL HOME 5–6 (2010),
available at http://www.aha.org/research/cor/content/patient-centered-medicalhome.pdf; see also Nat’l Acad. for State Health Pol’y, Medical Home & Patient-Centered
Care, http://www.nashp.org/med-home-map (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
58
See Ronald A. Paulus et al., Continuous Innovation in Health Care: Implications of
the Geisinger Experience, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1235, 1235 (2008); Robert J. Reid et al., The
Group Health Medical Home at Year Two: Cost Savings, Higher Patient Satisfaction, and Less
Burnout for Providers, 29 HEALTH AFF. 835, 835 (2010).
59
Reid, supra note 58, at 835. See also Eric B. Larson, Group Health Cooperative—
One Coverage-and-Delivery Model for Accountable Care, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1620, 1621
(2009) (summarizing results of study).
54
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60

plans for those with chronic illnesses.
It also included practice
changes such as longer physician visits, routine care-team “huddles”
to review patient needs, and greater involvement by nurses,
61
pharmacists, and medical assistants in coordinating patient care.
All this required more staff, the greatest source of the additional
costs directly attributable to the pilot (EHR improvements were costly
62
but system-wide). Early results showed that the added costs were
more than recouped by, among other results, significant reductions
in ER visits and hospitalizations (29 percent and 6 percent,
63
respectively).
The study results also showed improvements in
clinical quality, patient experiences (including self-reports of health
64
status), and staff burnout compared to control clinics. Based on this
experience, Group Health is now expanding the model to its other
65
clinics. The applicability of its experience elsewhere has limitations.
Group Health is a relatively closed system, serving as both insurer and
provider; moreover, it has a robust EHR and has long had a primary66
care focus.
A different medical home project in Camden, New Jersey
targeted the highest utilizers of emergency medical services in that
67
68
community. Most were uninsured or covered by a public program.
These “frequent flyers” typically had a constellation of poorly
managed chronic conditions, often including mental health issues
and substance abuse disorders, as well as complicating social
69
circumstances. As initially developed by Jeffrey Brenner, M.D., the
Camden medical home model relied on extensive patient outreach,
house calls (including by physicians), medical team meetings, and
70
flexible telephone and after-hours access.
60

Reid, supra note 58, at 837.
Id. at 836.
62
Id. at 841.
63
Id. at 840.
64
Id. at 842.
65
Clarissa Hsu et al., Spreading a Patient-Centered Medical Home Redesign: A Case
Study, 35 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGM’T. 99, 102 (2012).
66
Reid, supra note 58, at 835.
67
John V. Jacobi, High Utilizers of ED Services: Lessons for System Reform, 21 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 35, 35 (2012); see also Atul Gawande, The Hot Spotters: Can We Lower Medical
Costs by Giving the Neediest Patients Better Care?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 2011, at 41,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/01/24/110124fa_fact
_gawande.
68
Jacobi, supra note 67, at 36.
69
Id. at 35.
70
Gawande, supra note 67, at 41.
61
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The patients’ health indicators improved, and their ER usage
71
declined.
The project is now working to expand its population
focus and transition from grant-based support to sustainable funding
72
that leverages the down-stream savings. This is an impetus for New
73
Jersey’s newly authorized Medicaid ACO program. One of the many
interesting elements of this program is the possibility that community
organizations could share in any savings. This general possibility is
discussed by Bruce Landon and his co-authors who note that there is
an “unsettled policy conundrum” about whether these types of
payments “should be shared with a community-based organization
74
that works with multiple practices.” Apart from this novel Medicaid
ACO program, a number of states have Medicaid PCMH pilots under
75
construction or underway.
Employers have also initiated pilots. One example is the
“Boeing Intensive Outpatient Care Program,” which involved 750
76
employees with significant health issues. Boeing is a self-insured
77
airplane manufacturer and Washington State’s largest employer.
The employees were matched with a team of providers who offered
health services in a medical home model in exchange for their usual
fees plus a care management fee (the amount of which was not made
78
public).
Boeing reported in 2010 that overall costs for those
employees were twenty percent less than those of a control group,
mostly due to reduced hospitalizations and ER visits; other health and
79
satisfaction indicators also reportedly improved. Working with an
insurer that administers the health claims of its employees, Boeing
80
announced that it intends to scale up the program.
In addition, insurers across the country are rolling out
reimbursement systems that support the PCMH. Following a
71

Id. at 44.
Id. at 42.
73
Id. 44.
74
Landon, supra note 2, at 830.
75
AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICAL HOME 6 (2010), available at
http://www.aha.org/research/cor/content/patient-centered-medical-home.pdf;
Mary Takach, Reinventing Medicaid: State Innovations to Qualify and Pay for PatientCentered Medical Homes Show Promising Results, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1325, 1325 (2011).
76
Peter Neurath, Boeing Health Care Pilot Cut Costs 20 percent—and Improved Care,
SOUND
BUS.
J.,
Apr.
25,
2010,
PUGET
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2010/04/26/story4.html?page=all.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
72
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successful pilot project in Colorado, Wellpoint Inc., the nation’s
second-largest health insurer, announced a revised primary care
81
Physicians
payment program to begin in the summer of 2012.
whose practices qualify under PCMH criteria are eligible for fee
increases; they might also receive care management fees and shared
82
savings. Because Wellpoint insures 34 million Americans and has a
network of about 100 thousand primary care doctors, its system could
83
be quite influential.
Another for-profit insurer, Aetna Inc., has
plans to pay the 55 thousand primary care physicians in its network
an extra fee of $2–$3 a month per patient “if their practices are
certified as meeting certain standards for providing access for
84
patients and coordinating their care.”
The hope, of course, is that the short-term savings and quality
improvements demonstrated in small, targeted pilots will translate
into gains for large, generally applicable programs. One question is
whether higher payments from any one insurer will truly incentivize
practice investment and change primary care delivery. As the
medical director of an influential physician organization stated, “[I]f
you only have 10% of your practice that you’re getting paid extra for,
85
that’s not enough to get your attention.”
V. TESTING ONE MODEL HOME DESIGN AND FINANCE OPTION
Getting the attention of practice groups by involving most of
their payers is a key design aspect of Washington’s multi-payer, multisite pilot. In 2009, Washington’s legislature passed, and the governor
signed, a bill to “identify appropriate reimbursement methods to
align incentives in support of primary care medical homes” through a
86
multi-payer pilot project. The focus is on practice transformation,
not short-term financial savings. By its nature, the project requires
cooperation between payers, providers, and purchasers of health
care.
One of the reasons for the state’s establishment and oversight
explicitly is “to exempt [project activities] from state antitrust laws,
and to provide immunity from federal antitrust laws through the state
81

Christopher Weaver & Anna Wilde Mathews, An Rx? Pay More to Family Doctors,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2012, at B1.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
2009 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 305 (S.S.B 5891) (West).
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87

action doctrine.”
The state action doctrine, which is generally
disfavored, provides that state-mandated or state-directed restraints
88
be exempt from antitrust liability. For the doctrine to apply, the
state must act as a sovereign, rather than as a “participant in a private
89
agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade.” As has
happened in Pennsylvania, Vermont, Maine, and other states under
this type of framework, a health care agency brings together payers to
90
agree upon a different reimbursement model for a pilot.
In May 2011, Washington launched its multi-payer, multi-site
91
pilot. As explained in more detail below, the thirty-two-month pilot
92
involves seven health plans and eight primary care practices. The
practice sites receive from their insurers their usual FFS payments
plus a monthly care management fee (“CMF”) to support enhanced
93
primary care services and coordination. As evaluated at the end of
each year, if quality metrics are maintained and avoidable ER visits or
hospitalizations are reduced beyond the break-even targets, the
94
practice sites will share the financial savings with the insurers. If
quality is not maintained and/or usage not sufficiently reduced, the
practice sites face financial risk in the form of reductions in their
95
CMF going forward (and no shared savings). They also face the
financial risk that they will not recoup their outlays to provide the
added services.
One goal of the project was to involve most of the state’s
87

Id.; see Tara Adams Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations
to Avoid Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443, 1460–69 (2012) (explaining
applicability of state action doctrine to projects of this type).
88
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943); see also Ragone, supra note 87.
89
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351–52; see also Ragone, supra note 87.
90
JASON BUXBAUM & MARY TAKACH, STATE MULTI-PAYER MEDICAL HOME
INITIATIVES AND MEDICARE’S PRIMARY ADVANCED PRIMARY CARE DEMONSTRATION 2
(2010), available at http://nashp.org/sites/default/files/MedHomesWebinar.pdf.
91
Richard Onizuka, Assistant Dir., Wash. St. Health Care Auth. Washington
State Health Benefit Exchange, Presentation at Washington Healthcare Policy
Conference: State of Reform (Jan. 4, 2012) (notes on file with author) (slides
available at http://depts.washington.edu/rchpol/docs/2012_State_of_Reform-WAInsurance_Exchange_Panel.pdf.).
92
Multi-Payer Medical Home Pilot Launches, WEEKLY REPORT, (Wash. State Hosp.
Ass’n,
Seattle,
WA)
(July
17,
2011),
available
at
http://www.wsha.org/weeklyReportDetails.cfm?EID=2011-06-17%2000%3A00
%3A00%2E0.
93
Id.
94
WASH. ST. HEALTH CARE AUTH., MULTIPAYER REIMBURSEMENT MODEL PILOT:
PILOT
DESIGN
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.hca.wa.gov/documents/medical_homes/pilot_design.pdf.
95
Id.

SANFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

DESIGNING MODEL HOMES

10/22/2012 2:45 PM

1533

96

insurers. All of the state’s large commercial health plans—Aetna,
Cigna, Group Health, Regence, Premera, Molina, and Community
97
Collectively, they
Health Plan of Washington—are participating.
comprise more than half of the health insurance market in
98
Washington State. This group includes not only the commercially
insured, but also patients covered by self-insured plans, Medicare
Advantage, Medicaid Healthy Options, and Washington’s Basic
Health Program (state-subsidized insurance for low-income people
99
who are ineligible for Medicaid).
Medicare FFS declined to
100
participate, a disappointment for the planners.
Medicare is, as authorized by the ACA, participating in PCMH
101
demonstration projects in several other states.
The agency
apparently preferred projects that had more of a focus on quality
measures, did not preclude participation by small groups of
providers, and were already implemented or soon to be
102
implemented.
Having so many insurers involved was critical to this pilot’s
design. The practice changes are meant to apply—indeed under the
103
pilot’s rules have to apply—to all of a practice’s patients.
If
additional money is linked to only a fraction of the patients, there
simply will not be, the argument goes, financing or incentives for
broad-based transformation.
Single-payer pilots, as described above, have been significant in
shaping the PCMH model. They have, though, tended to apply to
relatively closed insurer-provider systems (as in the Group Health
pilot) or to a limited high-needs population (as in the Boeing pilot).
The new federal ACO program is a single-payer model (Medicare),
but the expectation has always been that commercial payers would
104
enter into similar agreements with the authorized ACOs.
Indeed,
96

Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, PhD Health Care Policy Director,
Washington State Health Care Authority (Nov. 23, 2010) (on file with author).
97
Multi-Payer Medical Home Pilot Launches, supra note 92.
98
Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, supra note 96.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.; see also Multi-Payer Advanced Primary Care Practice Demonstration Fact Sheet,
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.
(2012),
available
at
CTRS.
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/DemonstrationProjects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads//mapcpdemo_Factsheet.pdf.
102
Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, supra note 96.
103
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 5.
104
See Berwick, supra note 11, at 1753 (stating that new CMS programs are
intended to work “in synergy with the private sector”).
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that has proven to be the case with the first group of organizations
105
accepted into the program in April 2012.
The Washington pilot involves eight primary care practices at
106
twelve clinic sites.
As specified in the Invitation to Apply, all are
relatively advanced in their ability to provide comprehensive,
107
coordinated care. The sites do not need to be formally recognized
108
They are expected to
as a PCMH or seeking that recognition.
commit to key principles of the model and to “mak[ing] changes that
109
impact their entire practice population.” As is true of the Medicare ACO
program, changes (such as care coordination and follow-up) cannot
apply only to the population covered by the participating insurers.
All of the chosen sites had been involved in the state’s earlier Medical
110
Home Collaborative.
State law authorized this two-year
111
It was directed by the Health Care Authority and
collaborative.
involved thirty-three clinics in a variety of information and learning
112
activities.
105

Jenny Gold & Christian Torres, ACOs Multiply as Medicare Announces 27 New
Ones,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/April/10/ACO-Medicare-SharedSavings-Program.aspx?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign
=Feed%3A+khn%2Fheadlinesonly+(All+Kaiser+Health+News+(Headlines))
(“[A
CMS administrator] said many of the organizations are working with private health
insurers to serve patients not in the Medicare program.”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., FIRST ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE
SHARED
SAVINGS
PROGRAM
(Apr.
10,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/factsheet.asp?Counter=4334&intNumPerPa
ge=10&checkDate=&checkKey=&srchType=1&numDays=3500&srchOpt=0&srchData
=&keywordType=All&chkNewsType=6&intPage=&showAll=&pYear=&year=&desc=&c
boOrder=date.
106
Multi-Payer Medical Home Pilot Launches, supra note 92. One of these clinics, I
learned while doing this research, is where my own family practice physician
practices. Since the pilot launched and as of this writing, I have not been to the
clinic and have never spoken to her about it. As noted above, my husband’s family
practice clinic is not involved in this pilot, but another within the University of
Washington Neighborhood Clinics is.
107
All participated in a prior, state-sponsored medical home collaborative that
was intended to facilitate sharing of ideas for how to transform primary care
practices. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.70.533 (2010) (authorization for collaborative).
108
Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, supra note 96.
109
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 5 (emphasis in original).
110
Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, supra note 96.
111
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.54.380 (2010); see also Patient-Centered Medical Home
ST.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH,
Collaborative,
WASH.
http://www.medicalhome.org/physicians/learning_collab.cfm (last visited Oct. 2,
2012).
112
WASH.
STATE
HEALTH
CARE
AUTH.,
Medical
Homes,
http://www.hca.wa.gov/medical_homes.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); see also
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The Invitation to Apply provides some specifics. Eligible
practices had to have at least 8,000 active patients, four or more full113
time providers, and a focus on primary care.
They also had to be
paid mostly on a FFS basis, have at least a plan for a specific care
coordination system, and use a patient registry for those with one or
114
more chronic conditions or have an established EHR.
The Invitation to Apply lists several factors, which, while not
required, are desirable and considered likely for success. These
include extended hours (e.g., weekday evenings and Saturdays),
flexible access (e.g., email), and “a significant percentage of their
115
[patients] covered by the participating health plans.” Additionally,
the Invitation to Apply stresses that it is important to have, or be
developing, a “system of communication with the hospital” utilized by
116
most of the clinic’s patients. How will the clinic be notified that a
patient was seen in the ER? How will discharge planning be
coordinated?
One key issue with any type of enhanced primary care is figuring
out the sweet spot for additional payments. Bruce Landon and
117
others note that although the PCMH Joint Principles do not specify
a particular reimbursement strategy, the PCMH model suggests a
118
need for up-front funding. “The overriding policy concern related
to the medical home model in the short term is determining the
119
optimal way to finance its implementation.”
What amount is enough to incentivize real practice
transformation without consuming all downstream savings, assuming
there are any? As Princeton health economist Uwe Reinhardt has
120
noted, health care can legitimately absorb any dollar it is allocated.
Care coordination—with its phone calls, emails, and team meetings—
can be extremely labor-intensive. The labor of nurses, physicians’
assistants, and doctors is not cheap. Neither is the cost of EHRs or
extended office hours.
WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 111.
113
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 5.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 6.
116
Id.
117
See AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, supra note 52.
118
Landon et al., supra note 3, at 827.
119
Id. at 832.
120
See Healthcare Crisis: Who’s at Risk (PBS television broadcast Nov. 3, 2000)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/healthcarecrisis/transcript.html)
(paraphrasing Dr. Reinhardt’s comments).
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The payment model for this pilot is a hybrid one, with FFS, CMF,
and possible shared savings. After much negotiation, the pilot
determined that the CMF will be $2.50 per patient per month in the
first year and, assuming no reduction for poor outcomes, $2.00 per
121
patient per month in the second and third years of the pilot.
According to pilot director Richard K. Onizuka, PhD, arriving at
these amounts was one of the challenging aspects of the project’s
122
design. The CMF amount is calculated to be the point at which the
health plans’ investment is equal to the estimated savings from
123
expected reductions in hospital-based care.
The practices choose
whether their metric will be preventable ER visits or preventable
124
hospitalizations.
These new payments to the practices are in addition to fees
received from the participating insurers. The regular FFS payments
for office visits and other services do not change under this pilot.
Medicare will continue to pay for its enrollees within these practices
under its usual FFS reimbursement method. As a non-participant in
the pilot, Medicare will not contribute a CMF, and neither will
Medicaid FFS, non-participating commercial insurers, or self-pay
125
patients.
The proposed Medicare ACO rules did not include the
126
possibility of any upfront payments.
This was one of the many
criticized aspects of the proposal. The final rules released in October
2011 do allow upfront payments from Medicare to those ACOs that
127
are sponsored by physicians or by rural providers.
This change
recognized that physician groups and rural hospitals in particular
might lack the ready cash reserves needed to develop the
infrastructure necessary for coordinated care.
The Washington pilot also has a shared savings component,
much like the ACA’s Medicare ACO program. If there are further
reductions in preventable hospital-based care beyond the practicespecific targets, the practices that achieve these reductions will share

121

WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3.
Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, supra note 96.
123
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3.
124
Id.
125
See Telephone Interview with Richard Onizuka, supra note 96.
126
Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19528-01 (Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
425).
127
Id. at 67802.
122
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128

with the relevant insurers in any savings.
The calculations as to
129
usage and savings are to be done at the end of each pilot year. As
the pilot is still in its first year, there is no data yet.
The initial savings go first to the health insurers to recoup their
130
CMFs.
Beyond that, the practice and the plans share additional
131
savings equally.
For example, in initial modeling, the break-even
target for avoidable ER use is 17 percent (which would correlate with
reduced overall ER use of about 10 percent) and 2 percent for
avoidable hospitalization. Within the pilot, if a practice’s patients
reduce their avoidable ER use by more than 17 percent or avoidable
hospitalization by more than 2 percent, the practice and the relevant
insurers share in savings attributable to that further reduction. Each
insurer reaps benefits proportionate to its share of the practice’s
132
population.
The practices have to maintain their own baseline quality
133
measures. The pilot defined 7 quality measures, and the practices
must maintain a composite score across all indicators (within a 5
134
point corridor) on 7 out of 10.
As with the Medicare ACO, the
quality measures relate to performance of recommended screenings
(e.g., mammograms), management of chronic conditions (e.g., heart
disease), and experience measures (as to both patients and
135
physicians/staff). The Medicare ACO program has a couple of key
differences in this regard. First, it includes many more quality
metrics—33, down from the 65 included in the proposed rules.
Second, in a more classic pay-for-performance arrangement,
successful ACOs will ultimately have to meet or exceed a uniformly
136
applicable, standard quality level on the reported measures.
128

WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3–4.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Medical Home Pilots: Washington State Plan for Implementation, webcast
Aug. 5, 2010, available at http://www.wsha.org/files/Medical%20Homes
%20Pilot.pdf.
133
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3–4.
134
The Invitation to Apply specified 10 quality measures, see WASH. STATE HEALTH
CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3–4; but the project ultimately settled on 7 for practical
reasons. E-mail from Steve Lewis, Senior Health Policy Analyst, Wash. Health Care
Auth., to author (Sept. 21, 2012, 16:10 PST) (on file with author).
135
L. Gordon Moore, Multi-Payer Reimbursement Pilot, WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE
AUTH. (2010), available at http://www.hca.wa.gov/medical_homes.html.
136
Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67872.
129

SANFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1538

10/22/2012 2:45 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1519

Unlike the Medicare ACO program, the practices in this pilot do
face specific downside financial risk. Those practices that do not
meet their quality or usage targets will see a reduction in the
137
following year’s CMF. Rather than $2.00 per member per month, it
138
could go as low as $1.00 per member per month. Losing that much
of the CMF is unlikely, however, as it is a staggered adjustment, not
139
an all-or-nothing proposition. In addition, as with any pilot of this
nature, there is the general financial risk that the added payments
will not cover the added expenses and that a shared savings
expectation might be dashed.
VI. IS THERE NO PLACE LIKE HOME?
Washington’s pilot should help identify a sweet spot for
additional primary care reimbursement in a transforming health care
system. Likewise, it should help identify barriers to effective practice
transformation. It might also provide preliminary answers to some of
the other questions swirling around PCMHs and ACOs. Definitive,
fully transferable answers are unlikely. As with most pilots of this
nature, its time frame is short and its evaluative framework is
140
limited.
If change happens at the margins, though, perhaps
guidance emerges from the footnotes.
A. Isn’t There a Better Name?
141

As others have noted “medical home” conjures up visions of a
“nursing home.” “Patient-Centered Medical Home” does not really
change the vision much, is a mouthful, and sounds jargony. Are
other clinics really “staff-centered” or “insurer-oriented”? “PCMH”
has other problems, including that it is difficult to say. At least in
health care, the readily used acronyms are either short (e.g., ER) or
include at least one vowel (e.g., EMTALA) so they can be spoken as a

137

WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3–4.
Id.
139
Telephone Interview with Douglas A. Conrad, PhD, Prof., U. Wash. Sch. of
Pub. Health (Nov. 26, 2011) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Richard
Onizuka, supra note 96.
140
See Landon et al., supra note 2, at 833 (discussing reasons why “it is not likely
that existing patient-centered medical home demonstration projects will provide
definitive answers”).
141
Diane R. Rittenhouse & Stephen M. Shortell, The Patient-Centered Medical Home:
Will It Stand the Test of Health Reform?, 301 JAMA 2038, 2040 (2009); Murray Ross et
al., From Our Lips to Whose Ears? Consumer Reaction to Our Current Health Care Dialect, 13
PERMANENTE J. 8, 11 (2009).
138
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word.
It could be possible to poll the clinics involved in the pilot
project as well as those involved in the pre-cursor Collaborative.
What terminology do they use to distinguish themselves in their
advertising? What words do staff members use to describe their
clinics to patients or other non-medical people? “Enhanced primary
care” is an option, though a bit tepid. “Health care club” or “personal
medical team” are not quite right, but at least have positive
connotations.
Reasons for the prevalence of the “PCMH”
nomenclature probably relate both to its historical development and
its linkage with possible certification by the NCQA as such.
B. How Necessary is a Formal Recognition System?
The Washington pilot does not require that the participating
142
clinics seek NCQA recognition as PCMHs.
For insurers, this
designation might serve as ready shorthand for technical ability to
provide the type of care that would justify increased primary care
reimbursements. For the public, recognition and its attendant logo
might indicate a type of primary care it values. For individual health
care providers, it might suggest a clinic environment to seek, or to
avoid. Of course, there are attendant costs, including NCQA fees,
reporting obligations, and required processes. How does the value
stack up against the costs?
This pilot proceeds independent of formalized markers of a
PCMH. While there are some required and suggested proficiencies,
the participating clinics had to meet few set structural standards.
Thus, their experience might bear on the value of formal recognition
or measurable standards. Did the participating clinics obtain NCQA
recognition or do they intend to? The participating insurers could
also weigh in. Some of them have a national presence and likely have
opinions as to the uses of PCMH standards in different locales. It
might be that insurers that offer additional payments for enhanced
primary care effectively require some sort of formal PCMH
designation.
C. What do Patients Perceive?
143

Providing “the right care to the right patient at the right time”
142

WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 6 (noting that certification is
considered but not required as part of selection process).
143
Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
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does mean that some patients will get more physician time and more
medical treatment and others will get less of both. An email
exchange with a nurse might do for a discreet issue in a generally
healthy patient. A patient with complicated chronic conditions, on
the other hand, might be best served by pre-visit team meetings,
hour-long appointments, follow-up emails, nurse house calls, and
extra testing. Of course, the generally healthy patient might like all
that too.
A YouTube video with cartoon characters and computergenerated speech illustrates this point (and other health policy
issues):
“Hello. I am your doctor. Welcome to your patientcentered medical home. How may I help you?”
“My back hurts and I want an MRI scan.”
...
“Well, I looked it up [in our electronic health record] and
you do not need an MRI. You should go away, take some
acetaminophen, and rest.”
“I don’t want pills or rest. I want the scan. I looked this up
on the Internet and I could have cancer or a disc or need
an operation or need to see a neurosurgeon.”
“Why don’t I have you see one of our nurses, who can ask
you a lot of open-ended questions?”
...
“Hey, I know you are getting paid like nine dollars a month
to take care of me. . . . Maybe you should send me to a real
doctor that can get an MRI scan.”
“If I do that, we will not achieve patient-centeredness,
whole-person
orientation,
integrated
care,
and
coordination. I also will not get pay-for-performance and
your health insurance company will lose money, national
health care trends will skyrocket, electronic medical record
companies will go bankrupt, and to fix the budget we will
have to sell California to the Chinese government.”
“I want an MRI scan.”
144
“OK. . . . “
While the Washington pilot does not focus on improving quality,

Payment/ACO/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
144
DMCareBlog, Patient Centered Medical Home, YOUTUBE (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k7VH9ykZSB0. A similarly clever video pokes fun
at negotiations between a PCMH and hospital to link together and set up an ACO.
DMCareBlog, Setting Up An Accountable Care Organization, YOUTUBE (Oct. 20, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ULy5vjcGuDc&feature=relmfu.
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one of the quality markers to be assessed is patient satisfaction. As
the managed care backlash of the 1990s shows, patient satisfaction is
no small matter. If people—patients, providers, and the population
at large—believe care is being compromised to save money, they will
146
push employers, legislators, and insurers to change the model.
Other pilots have targeted the chronically ill and their needs for
147
additional services; this pilot does not. The selected clinics had to
be primary-care oriented, ideally with most patients covered by the
148
participating insurers. Thus the population is almost by definition
somewhat average for the locale, with high- and low-need patients,
many of whom could use their insurance to obtain care elsewhere.
Satisfaction indicators thus might be more transferable to the general
population.
D. Will it Actually Save Money?
Providing enhanced primary care to a general population might
both improve health outcomes and also raise overall costs. Good
preventative care may promote all sorts of values without actually
saving money, as Jessica Mantel notes in her article for this
149
Symposium.
For a variety of reasons, it is hard to reduce medical
interventions of marginal value. And of course, patients diagnosed
early with a chronic condition may then live long lives on expensive
medication.
Medical testing can be costly, particularly when
factoring in follow-up tests and false positives. And even if patients
are offered coordinated care and flexible scheduling, the ER might
seem more convenient.
One purpose of this pilot was to address the hesitancy of insurers
to pay the upfront costs needed to transform primary care.
Presumably, their hesitancy is not entirely irrational. “Tension exists
150
between payers and policy makers,” with the former seeking
evidence of significant cost savings and the latter focused on shoring
up primary care. For the pilot, one of the many bedeviling details
was figuring out an appropriate CMF to test. What amount of
upfront payment linked to a majority of a clinic’s patients will result
145

WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 25.
See, e.g., Shortell, supra note 2, at 408 (discussing importance of public
perception in acceptance of new organizational models).
147
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 3.
148
Id. at 5–6.
149
Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It
Too?, 42 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1393 (2012).
150
Landon, supra note 2, at 833.
146
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in enough downstream savings to make the arrangement financially
worthwhile?
Is it possible to recoup additional costs, including administrative
costs, under this model? The results of this and other studies over the
next several years should help answer this question. They should also
help clarify the role of shared savings, whether merely hoped for or
actually obtained. Determining the attributable costs is itself no small
matter. For example, information technology is central to the model
and expensive, but a robust EHR has a variety of other important
uses. A robust EHR can, for example, facilitate medical research,
support accurate billing, and qualify a facility for federal money
meant to encourage “meaningful use” of electronic medical
151
records. As with analysis of the Medicare ACO program, it will be
important to determine which costs should be considered part of that
particular change, and which should not.
E. Where Will the Providers Come From?
Enhanced primary care needs primary care providers. The
country currently faces a shortage of primary care physicians and
152
nurse practitioners, particularly in rural and inner-city areas. If the
Massachusetts experience and common sense are predictive, adding
millions to the rolls of the insured will exacerbate the problem.
Assuming the ACA goes forward and adds millions to the insured
rolls, the law’s provisions to increase primary care reimbursement
153
and training should help somewhat.
There are, though, practicerelated reasons for the shortage. Some of these might be addressed
by the PCMH.
One of the quality measures in this pilot is the experience of
154
providers and staff in the clinics. The Group Health medical home
pilot noted a reduction in measures of workplace stress and physician
151

See, e.g., Bradford H. Gray et al., Electronic Health Records: An International
Perspective on “Meaningful Use,” 28 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 1 (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue
%20Brief/2011/Nov/1565_Gray_electronic_med_records_meaningful_use_intl
_brief.pdf.
152
Esme Cullen et al., Primary Care Shortage: Background Brief, HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND (Apr. 2011), http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/Primary-CareShortage/Background-Brief.aspx.
153
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 3021, 124 Stat. 389 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a) (testing new payment
models), Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 5301, 124 Stat. 615 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
293k) (primary care training and enhancement).
154
WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 7, at 25.
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burnout, and also showed an increase in satisfaction with work
156
assignments. It is hoped, of course, that this is an inherent feature
of the PCMH and not a selection bias unique to that particular study.
F.

Is This a Repeat of Past Reforms?

The managed care revolution of the 1980s and 1990s promoted
integration and capitation. Both feature in current reform efforts,
including accountable care and medical homes. Will today’s efforts
be different, or more successful? Writes one skeptic of the capitation
model within ACOs: “The problem with this movie is that we’ve
157
actually seen it before and it was a colossal and expensive failure.”
As with any PCMH pilot, real savings are likely to come from
efforts targeted at those with complex medical problems and/or high
usage of hospital-based services. These high-cost patients will need to
be effectively managed, but in ways that do not trigger another
“managed care backlash.” Ideally, this multi-payer, multi-site pilot
will produce some indicia as to these patients’ experiences in
particular.
G. Will We See True Coordination?
Coordinated care requires coordination. That is not a strength
of the current system. And the United States lags other industrialized
countries in the adoption of the EHRs that help facilitate
158
coordination. Private-sector initiatives, as well as the recent federal
initiatives and stimulus funding, promote adoption of these
159
expensive systems.
Having an EHR doesn’t mean, however, that
others involved in a patient’s care can easily use it; technological
incompatibility and privacy concerns can get in the way. Entirely
apart from these challenges, the siloed FFS system has not historically
provided much incentive for robust cooperation. The incentives are
changing, though, and have been prior to the ACA’s boost.
This is apparent in the nationwide frenzy of affiliations, joint
ventures, alliances, acquisitions, and mergers involving hospitals and
155

Reid, supra note 58, at 837, 842.
Id.
157
FURROW, supra note 3, at 205 (citing Jeff Goldsmith, The Accountable Care
Organization: Not Ready For Prime Time, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009, 3:22
PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/).
158
Gray et al., supra note 151, at 1.
159
See, e.g., Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act (HITECH), Pub. L. No. 111-5, Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV, 123 Stat. 226,
467 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
156
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160

physician groups. Part of this is driven by the expectation that not
all will survive. One talk at the Seton Hall Symposium was entitled
“The Prospect of Being Hanged: Focusing the Physician Mind on
161
ACOs.” As to hospitals, they need to seriously consider getting on
the accountable care train or risk getting run over by those that have
adopted a coordinated model. If there is less hospitalization, not all
hospitals will survive.
PCMHs in general and this pilot in particular share many
features of the Medicare ACO program and its incentives for care
coordination. This pilot does not, however, require the solid linkages
with hospitals and specialists that are a hallmark of accountable
162
care.
Hospitals and specialists will not share directly (or even
necessarily indirectly) in savings that result from reduced usage of
their services by patients in the participating primary care clinics.
One breakeven point for this pilot is calculated to be roughly a
163
17 percent reduction in avoidable ER visits by those patients. The
hope is that there will be even greater reductions, and thus savings
shared between the clinics and the insurers. Will hospitals and
specialists find a way to increase their usage and make up for their
lost revenues in other ways, thus negating any overall savings? Or will
there be other integrative affiliations, as formal ACOs or otherwise,
that appropriately sort out the financing? Elliott Fisher, who has
written extensively about ACOs and PCMHs, cautions that, to
succeed, the PCMH “needs a hospitable and high-performing
164
medical neighborhood.”
It needs connections to, and support
from, the hospitals and specialists whose revenues it is intended to
reduce.
H. Will Success be Transformative?
Assume that this pilot is wildly successful in all key aspects.
Quality measures are stable, avoidable ER use is reduced by more
than 17 percent, savings are shared, patients and staff are happy. Will
its success translate to changes elsewhere in the country? Not
necessarily. The “field of health care is littered with the corpses of

160

Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations, A New New Thing With Some
Old Problems, 3 HEALTH L. OUTLOOK 6, 8–9 (2010).
161
Hal Teitelbaum, CEO and Managing Partner, Crystal Run Healthcare, The
Prospect of Being Hanged: Focusing the Physician Mind on ACOs (Oct. 28, 2011).
162
See Fisher, supra note 32, at 220.
163
See Moore, supra note 135.
164
Fisher, supra note 5, at 1205.
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good ideas” and successful pilots. The system’s fragmentation, cost,
complexity, and ingrained interests can hinder adoption of novel
ideas. Local successes often remain local.
Now, however, there are significant national forces supporting
fundamental transformation of the health care financing and delivery
systems. There is, of course, the ACA, with its new Medicare ACO
program, and initiatives supporting PCMHs, bundled payments, and
other measures. It is not just the federal law, though. National
initiatives by insurers and employers are supportive of a
transformation that rewards value, not just volume. This wide range
of support should ensure attention to lessons from pilots, and
perhaps broad adoption of their successful aspects.
VII. BUILDING BEFORE THE DRAFTING INK DRIES
Efforts to construct new payment and delivery systems are sure to
continue whether the Affordable Care Act is repealed or reenergized, replaced or refined. There is simply too much interest
from all quarters, too much concern about rising costs and lackluster
quality outcomes. Construction is proceeding although there is no
agreement on the best designs or financing models. Writing about
the PCMH, Rittenhouse and Shortell conclude that “[m]arketplace
and political realities will necessitate action on delivery system
reform before evidence is available to determine the optimal course
166
of action.”
It might well be true that the multiplicity of pilots and programs
167
and demonstrations is a strength and that “not knowing the final
168
Arguably, this is a
design should not deter us from beginning.”
situation in which a “more ‘intuitive’ approach to health policy”
makes sense and “interventions will evolve over time based on
169
[emerging] data.”
This has parallels to fast- track construction in
which work begins on foundational elements that have a long lead
time, although the building’s final design is incomplete.
165

Aaron Katz, Gawande and the “Great Idea” Theory, SEATTLEPI.COM (Feb. 14, 2011,
5:00 AM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/thehealthretort/2011/02/14/gawande-andthe-%E2%80%9Cgreat-idea%E2%80%9D-theory/.
166
Rittenhouse & Shortell, supra note 141, at 2040.
167
Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34 (“Almost half
of [the Senate health reform bill] is devoted to programs that would test various ways
to curb costs and increase quality. The bill is a hodgepodge. And it should be.”).
168
John K. Iglehart, No Place Like Home—Testing a New Model of Care Delivery, 359
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1200, 1202 (2008).
169
Landon et al., supra note 2, at 833.
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This sort of expedited construction should encourage attention
to model homes and their early lessons. The Washington State
“Multi-Payer Medical Home Reimbursement Pilot” is meant to be an
170
early step in a larger transition. This larger transition is supported
by the complicated rezoning effort that is the Medicare ACO
program, the substantial federal effort that got underway about a year
171
after Washington’s pilot launched.
Results from the Washington pilot might also help answer some
of the questions swirling around accountable care in general and the
PCMH model in particular. This pilot should provide preliminary
answers about the value of its alternative payment approach for
PCMHs: continued FFS payments at the usual rates; a CMF of $2.50
the first year and up to $2.00 for the following two years; and the
prospect of savings shared between the clinics and the insurers. Does
this payment approach support the practice changes needed to costeffectively reduce unnecessary ER visits and hospital admissions? To
what extent will the clinics see shared savings? Will there even be any
savings?
In addition, perhaps the study will discover a better, more
appropriately evocative name for this type of enhanced primary care.
It might also provide evidence about the value of a formal PCMH
recognition system, whether by the NCQA or other set criteria. More
fundamentally, will patients buy into this new delivery system, or will
we see a twenty-first century version of the managed care backlash of
the last century? And what about physicians, primary care and
otherwise? Will there be true coordination and cooperation or, in
the face of real threats to hospital and specialist reimbursements,
opposition and obstruction? Even if this pilot and others like it
succeed, will that success impact the broader system?
The ultimate issue is how these redesigned homes will fit into
the rezoned medical neighborhood. As with any rezone, assessment
of its results awaits development and usage. Although construction is
well under way, the drafting plans are still new. They are still subject
to revision. The ongoing Washington State pilot project, and others
170

See WASH. ST. HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 94; Model Homes, WASH. ST.
HEALTH CARE AUTH., http://www.hca.wa.gov/medical_homes.html (discussing the
various pilot projects underway) (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
171
Washington’s pilot launched in May 2011. See WASH. ST. HEALTH CARE AUTH.,
supra note 94.
The Medicare ACO program announced the first group of “pioneer” ACOs in
December 2011, and the first group of regular ACOs in April 2012. See Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 36.
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like it, might suggest blueprint revisions to better design medical
homes for the changing health care neighborhoods.

